The design of computationally efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms that solve or approximate fundamental resource allocation problems is the main goal of algorithmic mechanism design. A central example in both theory and practice is welfare-maximization in combinatorial auctions. Recently, a randomized mechanism has been discovered for combinatorial auctions that is truthful in expectation and guarantees a (1 − 1/e)approximation to the optimal social welfare when players have coverage valuations [11] . This approximation ratio is the best possible even for non-truthful algorithms, assuming P = N P [16] .
Abstract-The design of computationally efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms that solve or approximate fundamental resource allocation problems is the main goal of algorithmic mechanism design. A central example in both theory and practice is welfare-maximization in combinatorial auctions. Recently, a randomized mechanism has been discovered for combinatorial auctions that is truthful in expectation and guarantees a (1 − 1/e)approximation to the optimal social welfare when players have coverage valuations [11] . This approximation ratio is the best possible even for non-truthful algorithms, assuming P = N P [16] .
Given the recent sequence of negative results for combinatorial auctions under more restrictive notions of incentive compatibility [7] , [2] , [9] , this development raises a natural question: Are truthful-in-expectation mechanisms compatible with polynomialtime approximation in a way that deterministic or universally truthful mechanisms are not? In particular, can polynomial-time truthfulin-expectation mechanisms guarantee a near-optimal approximation ratio for more general variants of combinatorial auctions?
We prove that this is not the case. Specifically, the result of [11] cannot be extended to combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations in the value oracle model. (Absent strategic considerations, a (1 − 1/e)-approximation is still achievable in this setting [25] .) More precisely, we prove that there is a constant γ > 0 such that there is no randomized mechanism that is truthful-in-expectationor even approximately truthful-in-expectation -and guarantees an m −γ -approximation to the optimal social welfare for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations in the value oracle model.
We also prove an analogous result for the flexible combinatorial public projects (CPP) problem, where a truthful-in-expectation (1 − 1/e)-approximation for coverage valuations has been recently developed [13] . We show that there is no truthful-in-expectationor even approximately truthful-in-expectation -mechanism that achieves an m −γ -approximation to the optimal social welfare for combinatorial public projects with submodular valuations in the value oracle model. Both our results present an unexpected separation between coverage functions and submodular functions, which does not occur for these problems without strategic considerations.
INTRODUCTION
The design of incentive-compatible mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions is a central problem of algorithmic mechanism design. In a combinatorial auction, there are n players and a set M of m items. Player i has a (private) valuation function v i : 2 M → R + which is assumed to be monotone (v i (S) ≤ v i (T ) whenever S ⊂ T ) and normalized (v i (∅) = 0). The goal is to * Supported by NSF Grant CCF-0448664. design a computationally efficient mechanism that yields an allocation of items (S 1 , . . . , S n ) to the players along with payments (p 1 , . . . , p n ) so that (a) the social welfare n i=1 v i (S i ) is approximately maximized, and (b) the mechanism is incentive-compatible, or truthful, meaning that each player maximizes his utility v i (S i ) − p i by reporting his true valuation v i . This problem has been studied extensively in both strategic and non-strategic settings. Various strategic solution concepts have been considered, including deterministic truthfulness, universal truthfulness, and truthfulness in expectation. Moreover, both strategic and non-strategic formulations of the problem have been studied for various restricted classes of valuations, as well as under various assumptions on how valuations are accessed or represented. Absent assumptions on the class of valuations, the welfare maximization problem is very hard to approximate even by non-truthful algorithms (NP-hardness of m −1/2 -approximation follows from the set packing problem). Better approximation ratios are possible for valuation classes that restrict complementarity between items. A prominent class of such valuations are submodular functions: functions v i where the marginal value v i (S ∪{j})−v i (S) for a each fixed item j is non-increasing in S. It is known that the welfare maximization problem with submodular valuation functions admits a (non-truthful) (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm [25] , and this is optimal assuming P = N P [16] . The hardness result of [16] holds even in the special case of coverage valuations; the algorithmic result of [25] holds in the value oracle model, where each v i can be queried only through an oracle returning v i (S) for a given query S. This is also the model we consider in this paper. It is known that a (1 − 1/e + )-approximation for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders would require exponentially many value queries [20] .
The classical VCG mechanism is incentive compatible and maximizes welfare in combinatorial auctions. Unfortunately, however, VCG can not be implemented in polynomial time even for very special classes of valuation functions, including submodular functions. Combining computational efficiency and truthfulness for combinatorial auctions appears difficult. A series of works have provided evidence that computational efficiency and truthfulness are in conflict: (deterministic) VCG-type mechanisms have been ruled out Figure 1 . Currently known results for combinatorial auctions: approximation | inapproximability. If only one result is given, it is known to be optimal. For randomized maximal-in-range (universally truthful) mechanisms, it is known that it is hard to achieve a better than 1/n-approximation for coverage valuations; however, other universally truthful mechanisms might exist. No non-trivial hardness was previously known for truthful-in-expectation combinatorial auctions, even when restricted to maximal-in-distributional-range mechanisms.
Class of valuations
for submodular combinatorial auctions in the communication complexity model [7] , and even for explicitly given budgetadditive valuations [2] . Recently, Dobzinski [9] proved that there is no deterministic truthful or even randomized universally truthful mechanism for submodular combinatorial auctions in the value oracle model, achieving an approximation ratio better than m −1/2 . Therefore, it came as a surprise when a (1 − 1/e)approximate randomized mechanism was discovered by Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [11] for a large subclass of submodular valuations. Their mechanism is truthful in expectation -a weaker notion than truthfulness in the universal sense -and applies to explicitly represented coverage functions. More generally, their mechanism applies to "black-box" valuations expressible as weighted sums of matroid rank functions, provided they support "lottery-value queries" (what is the expectation E[v i ( x)] for a given product distribution x). The mechanism can be also implemented in the value oracle model, at the cost of relaxing the solution concept to approximate truthfulness in expectation [12] .
This development raises a natural question: Could truthfulness-in-expectation be the cure for combinatorial auctions, perhaps providing an optimal (1 − 1/e)approximation for all submodular valuations? Given that a (1 − 1/e)-approximation for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions (without truthfulness) was also discovered first for coverage functions [8] , then for weighted sums of matroid rank functions [4] and later extended to monotone submodular functions [25] , it seems reasonable to conjecture that the same might happen for truthful-inexpectation mechanisms.
Our results: We prove that this is not the case, and there is a significant separation between the class of coverage functions and general monotone submodular functions. More precisely, there is no truthful-in-expectation mechanism (even (1 − )-approximately truthful-in-expectation) for submodular combinatorial auctions in the value oracle model, guaranteeing an approximation better than 1/m γ for some fixed , γ > 0 (Theorem 5.1). In particular, the results of [11] cannot be extended to all monotone submodular functions. We also prove a similar result for the flexible submodular combinatorial public projects problem (see Section 4 for a history of this problem): there is no (1 − )-approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism providing approximation better than 1/m γ for some γ > 0. This is true even in the case of a single player. The combinatorial public projects problem admits a simpler structure than combinatorial auctions, and hence we deal with it first to demonstrate our approach.
Our techniques: Our hardness results are obtained by combining two recently developed techniques: the symmetry gap technique for submodular functions [26] , and the direct hardness approach for combinatorial auctions [9] .
First, we consider the possibility of maximal-indistributional range (MIDR) mechanisms. We endeavor to explain why the approach of [11] breaks down when applied to monotone submodular functions. The answer lies in a certain convexity phenomenon that can be exploited in a symmetry gap argument. The symmetry gap argument on its own rules out the approach of [11] . Furthermore, it is possible to generalize the argument to an arbitrary MIDR mechanism, and moreover amplify the gap to some constant power of m. In fact our approach rules out even non-uniform approximately-MIDR mechanisms.
In the case of combinatorial public projects (CPP), we prove that if non-uniformity is allowed, then approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanisms are no more powerful than MIDR mechanisms. Therefore, by ruling out MIDR mechanisms, we also rule out truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. In the case of combinatorial auctions, no such equivalence in power between truthful-in-expectation and MIDR mechanisms is known. Instead, we apply the direct hardness approach of Dobzinski [9] to identify a single player for whom the allocation problem in some sense mimics the CPP problem. Again, the symmetry gap argument can be used here, though payments complicate the picture. We address this difficulty by employing a scaling argument and invoking the separating hyperplane theorem -this allows us to essentially get rid of the payments and use the same gap amplification technique we used for the CPP problem.
Organization: After the preliminaries (Section 2), we present our intuition on the separation between coverage and submodular functions in Section 3. Then we present an overview of our proofs for combinatorial public projects (Section 4) and for combinatorial auctions (Section 5). The complete proofs are deferred to the full version.
PRELIMINARIES

Mechanism Design Basics
Mechanism Design Problems: We consider mechanism design problems where there are n players, and a set Ω of feasible solutions. Each player i has a non-negative valuation function v i : Ω → R + . We are concerned with welfare maximization problems, where the objective is n i=1 v i (ω). Mechanisms: We consider direct-revelation mechanisms for mechanism design problems. Such a mechanism comprises an allocation rule A, which is a function from (hopefully truthfully) reported valuation functions v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) to an outcome A(v) ∈ Ω, and a payment rule p, which is a function from reported valuation functions to a required payment p i (v) from each player i. We allow the allocation and payment rules to be randomized. We restrict our attention to mechanisms that are individually
, when the expectations are over the random coins of the mechanism.
Truthfulness: A mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is truthful-in-expectation if every player always maximizes its expected payoff by truthfully reporting its valuation function, meaning that
for every player i, (true) valuation function v i , (reported) valuation function v i , and (reported) valuation functions v −i of the other players. The expectation in (1) is over the coin flips of the mechanism. If (1) holds for every flip of the coins, rather than merely in expectation, we call the mechanism universally truthful.
VCG-Based Mechanisms: Mechanisms for welfare maximization problems are often variants of the classical VCG mechanism. Recall that the VCG mechanism is defined by the (generally intractable) allocation rule that selects the welfare-maximizing outcome with respect to the reported valuation functions, and the payment rule that charges each player i a bid-independent "pivot term" minus the reported welfare earned by other players in the selected outcome. This (deterministic) mechanism is truthful; see e.g. [22] .
Let dist(Ω) denote the probability distributions over the set of feasible solutions Ω, and let R ⊆ dist(Ω) be a compact subset of them. The corresponding Maximal in Distributional Range (MIDR) allocation rule is defined as follows: given reported valuation functions v 1 , . . . , v n , return an outcome that is sampled randomly from a distribution D * ∈ R that maximizes the expected welfare E ω∼D [ i v i (ω)] over all distributions D ∈ R. Analogous to the VCG mechanism, there is a (randomized) payment rule that can be coupled with this allocation rule to yield a truthful-in-expectation mechanism (see [6] ). We note that deterministic MIDR allocation rules -i.e. those where R is a set of point distributions -are called maximal-in-range (MIR).
Approximate Truthfulness: For ≥ 0, a mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is
(2) for every player i, (true) valuation function v i , (reported) valuation function v i , and (reported) valuation functions v −i of the other players. The expectation in (2) is over the coin flips of the mechanism. Using the fact that payments are nonnegative in expectation, a (1 − )-approximately truthful-inexpectation mechanism also satisfies the following weaker condition. (This condition is sufficient for our hardness results.)
(3) Approximately truthful mechanisms are related to approximately maximal-in-distributional-range allocation rules. An
We show in Appendix A a sense in which approximately maximalin-distributional-range allocation rules are no less powerful -in terms of approximating the social welfare -than approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanisms.
Our main reason for considering the notion of approximate truthfulness is that the mechanisms of [11] , [13] , if implemented in the value oracle model, are only approximately truthful-in-expectation (for an arbitrarily small > 0, see [12] ). The value oracle model seems too weak to make the mechanisms of [11] , [13] exactly truthful-in-expectation; however, [12] makes it quite conceivable that there might be an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations.
Combinatorial Auctions
In Combinatorial Auctions there is a set M of m items, and a set of n players. Each player i has a valuation function v i :
A feasible solution is an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), where S i denotes the items assigned to player i, and {S i } i are mutually disjoint subsets of M . Player i's value for outcome (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is equal to v i (S i ). The goal is to choose an allocation maximizing social welfare: i v i (S i ).
Combinatorial Public Projects
In Combinatorial Public Projects there is a set [m] = {1, . . . , m} of projects, a cardinality bound k such that 0 ≤ k ≤ m, and a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of players. Each player i has a valuation function v i :
In this paper, we focus on the flexible variant of combinatorial public projects: a feasible solution is a set S ⊆ [m] of projects with |S| ≤ k. Player i's value for outcome S is equal to v i (S). Prior work [24] , [3] , [9] has also considered the exact variant, where a feasible solution is a set S ⊆ [m] with |S| = k. In both variants, the goal is to choose a feasible set S maximizing social welfare:
INTUITION -WHAT FAILS FOR SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS?
The main obstacle in proving our hardness result for submodular functions is the fact that the natural subclass of coverage functions does admit a truthful-in-expectation (1 − 1/e)-approximation [11] . In the absence of strategic considerations, coverage functions capture the full difficulty of submodular functions in the context of welfare maximization, in the sense that they exhibit the same hardness threshold of 1−1/e. Hence, it is not immediately clear where the dramatic jump in hardness should come from.
Let us recall the main idea of [11] : Let f : 2 M → R + be a submodular set function. Given x ∈ [0, 1] M , the expected value of f (S) when S includes each item j independently with probability x j is measured by the multilinear extension F (x), which has been previously used in work on submodular maximization [4] , [25] , [17] , [26] , [23] . F is an extension of f , in the sense that it agrees with f on integer points, and therefore maximizing F (x) over fractional allocations would yield an optimal algorithm. However, F (x) is not a concave function and can be maximized only approximately. Instead, the authors of [11] consider a different rounding process -which they call the Poisson rounding scheme -that includes each j in S with probability 1 − e −xj instead. The expected value of applying the Poisson rounding rounding scheme to a point x is measured by a modified function
, which fortuitously turns out to be concave for a subclass of submodular functions, including coverage functions and weighted sums of matroid rank functions. In this case, F exp (x) can be maximized exactly, and yields a maximalin-distributional-range algorithm whose range is the image of the Poisson rounding scheme. Since the ratio between F (x) and F exp (x) is bounded by 1 − 1/e, this leads to a truthful-in-expectation (1 − 1/e)-approximation.
The first question is whether F exp can be maximized for any monotone submodular function. It was observed by the authors of [11] that F exp is not concave for every submodular function: one example is the budget-additive function f (S) = min{ i∈S w i , 2} where w 1 = w 2 = w 3 = 1 and w 4 = 2. Hence convex optimization techniques cannot be used for F exp (x) directly; still, perhaps F exp (x) could be maximized for a different reason. We prove that this is impossible, using a symmetry gap argument [15] , [20] , [26] .
The budget-additive function above does not lend itself well to the symmetry gap argument, because there is a clear asymmetry between the elements of weight 1 and the element of weight 2. Instead, we construct an example where F exp is not concave and all elements are in some sense "equivalent". For this purpose, we use the following construction: If f 1 , f 2 : 2 M → [0, 1] are monotone submodular functions, then
is also a monotone submodular function (we omit the proof). In particular, let
for some α > 0. These are budget-additive and hence monotone submodular functions. Therefore the following function is also monotone submodular:
Here, (y) + = max{y, 0} denotes the positive part of a number. Let's consider the function
. If m → ∞, a random set obtained by sampling with probabilities 1 − e −xi will have cardinality very close to (1 − e −xi ). We obtain
The reader can verify that this function is concave for α = 1. But this is a very special coincidence. (The reason is that f for α = 1 can be represented as a coverage function.) Any smaller value of α, for instance α = 1/2, gives a nonconcave function F exp , as can be seen by checking
is not concave and moreover, all elements play the same symmetric role in f . (Formally, f has an element-transitive group of symmetries.) Functions of this type will play a crucial role in our proof.
The symmetry gap argument: The symmetry gap argument from [26] , building up on previous work [15] , [20] , shows the following: Instances exhibiting some kind of symmetry can be blown up and modified in such a way that the only solutions that an algorithm can find (using a polynomial number of value queries) are symmetric with respect to the same notion of symmetry. Thus the gap between symmetric and asymmetric solutions implies an inapproximability threshold. We use this argument here as follows. The instance above (for α = 1/2) can be slightly modified as in [15] , [20] , [26] , in such a way that it is impossible to find any solution that is asymmetric with respect to M 1 , M 2 . Consider the optimization problem max{F exp (x) :
x i ≤ m}.
The best symmetric solution is F exp ( 1 2 1 M ) 0.955, while the optimum is F exp (1 M1 ) = 1. The only solutions found by a polynomial number of value queries are the symmetric ones, and hence we cannot solve the optimization problem within a factor better than 0.955. A similar argument shows that we cannot solve the welfare maximization problem (for 2 players) with respect to F exp (x) within a factor better than 0.955.
In the following, we harness this construction towards showing that there can be no good maximum-indistributional-range mechanism, and eventually, no good truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
HARDNESS FOR COMBINATORIAL PUBLIC PROJECTS
We start with the combinatorial public project problem. The (exact) combinatorial public project problem was introduced in [24] as a model problem for the study of truthful approximation mechanisms. This problem is better understood than combinatorial auctions, in the sense that a useful characterization of all deterministic truthful mechanisms is known: every truthful mechanism for 2 players is an affine maximizer -a weighted generalization of maximal-in-range mechanisms [24] . Using this characterization, it was proved in [24] that the exact submodular CPP problem does not admit any (deterministic) truthful m −1/2 -approximation using a subexponential amount of communication, and moreover there is no m −1/2 -approximation even for a certain class of succintly represented submodular valuations unless N P ⊆ BP P . In contrast, the simple greedy algorithm is a non-truthful (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for this problem [21] . This was the first example of such a dramatic gap in approximability between truthful mechanisms and non-truthful algorithms.
In follow-up work, a simpler characterization-type statement for CPP was shown in [3] : Every truthful mechanism for a single player with a coverage valuation can, via a non-uniform polynomial time reduction, be converted to a truthful maximal-in-range mechanism without degrading its approximation ratio. Since every truthful mechanism for n players must embed a truthful mechanism for a single player, this allowed the authors to restrict attention to maximal-inrange mechanisms for a single player in proving an m −1/2approximation threshold for CPP with coverage valuations, assuming that N P ⊆ P/poly. The following easy converse of their characterization is notable: A maximal-in-range mechanism for CPP with a single player can directly be used as a maximal-in-range mechanism for any number of players.
Recently, it was proved by Dobzinski [9] that the exact variant of the submodular CPP problem (under the constraint |S| = k) does not admit a truthful-in-expectation m −1/2approximation in the value oracle model. However, as noted in [9] , the flexible variant of CPP (under the constraint |S| ≤ k) is arguably more natural in the strategic setting. For the flexible variant of CPP, [9] proves that there is no universally truthful m −1/2 -approximation, but leaves open the possibility of a better truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Problems that have a packing structure like flexible CPP have historically proven to be easier to approximate using truthful-in-expectation mechanisms [19] , [6] , [10] , [11] . Flexible CPP has exhibited a similar pattern; Dughmi [13] recently designed a truthful-in-expectation (1 − 1/e)approximation mechanism for CPP when players have explicit coverage valuations (which is optimal regardless of strategic issues [14] ), and more generally when players have matroid rank sum valuations that support a certain randomized variant of value queries.
Transformation to MIDR mechanisms: While deterministic truthful mechanisms for the CPP problem are no more powerful in terms of approximation than maximal-inrange mechanisms [24] , [3] , the situation is slightly more complicated for randomized mechanisms. It is not clear whether truthful-in-expectation mechanisms are equivalent to maximal-in-distributional-range mechanisms. Nonetheless, we prove the following. ≥ 0 and c(m) > 0 the following holds. If there is a (1 − )-approximately truthfulin-expectation mechanism M for the (exact or flexible) CPP problem that achieves a c(m)-approximation for submodular valuations on m elements, then for any δ > 0 there is a non-uniform (1 − 3 − δ)-approximately maximal-indistributional-range mechanism M that achieves a c(m)approximation for submodular valuations on m elements and uses at most m more value queries than M.
By a non-uniform mechanism, we mean a separate fixed mechanism for each input size m; i.e., the size of the program can depend arbitrarily on m. The only bound on the non-uniform mechanism is the number of value queries used. The main idea is that the although the range of prices offered by a truthful-in-expectation mechanism can be unbounded, the mechanism can be made MIDR "in the limit", when the input valuation is scaled by a sufficiently large constant. This constant can be fixed for each input size m and acts as an "advice string" to the mechanism. We present the proof in the Appendix.
Hardness for MIDR mechanisms: Our hardness result for flexible submodular CPP rules out mechanisms purely based on the number of value queries used, and hence it rules out even the non-uniform mechanisms mentioned in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2. There are absolute constants , γ > 0 such that there is no (1 − )-approximately maximal-indistributional-range mechanism for the flexible submodular CPP problem with 1 player in the value oracle model, max{f (S) : |S| ≤ k}, achieving a better than 1/m γapproximation in expectation in the objective function, where m is the size of the ground set. This holds even for nonuniform mechanisms of arbitrary computational complexity, as long as the number of value queries is bounded by poly(m).
In the following, we present a sketch of the proof of this theorem. The full proof is deferred to the journal version.
Proof strategy: We assume that a mechanism optimizes over a range of distributions R. (We assume for simplicity that the mechanism is MIDR rather than approximately MIDR.) We emphasize that the range R is fixed beforehand, and the mechanism must optimize over R for any particular submodular function f . This gives us a lot of flexibility in arguing about the properties of R.
Suppose that the size of the ground set is m = 2 O( ) and the cardinality bound is k = m/2 . We consider + 1 different "levels" of valuation functions. (See Figure 2. ) At level 0, we have a set A (0) of m/2 items, where the valuation function is nonzero and additive. Assuming that the mechanism achieves a c-approximation, there must be a distribution D 0 ∈ R which allocates at least a c-fraction of A (0) in expectation to player i. This must be true for every set A (0) of size m/2 . It will be useful to think of this set as random (and hidden from the mechanism.) Figure 2 . A bisection sequence (A (j) , B (j) ), with the distributions D j returned by the mechanism at level j. The density of D j increases in a certain technical sense exponentially in j, although much slower than 2 j . At level j, 1 ≤ j ≤ , we have a (random) set A (j) of m/2 −j items, which is partitioned randomly into two sets A (j−1) ∪ B (j−1) of equal size; these are level-(j − 1) sets. The valuation function at level j will be as in Section 3 but restricted to the set A (j) = A (j−1) ∪ B (j−1) (the two parts play the role of M 1 , M 2 from Section 3). The mechanism can detect the set A (j) ; however, the partition of A (j) into A (j−1) ∪ B (j−1) remains hidden. By the symmetry gap argument, the mechanism cannot learn what the partition is, and hence any distribution D j returned by the algorithm will be with high probability balanced with respect to (A (j−1) , B (j−1) ). The MIDR property implies that this distribution must be "dense" enough in order to beat the distribution D j−1 guaranteed by the previous level, which is sensitive to the partition (A (j−1) , B (j−1) ). (By density, we mean a certain notion of average size for sets sampled from D j .) Since distributions concentrated inside A (j−1) or B (j−1) are more profitable than distributions balanced between (A (j−1) , B (j−1) ), we will ideally obtain a constantfactor boost in density at each level. As grows, this will eventually contradict the fact that the mechanism cannot choose more than k items.
Finding the right definition of density that yields a constant-factor boost at each level is the main technical difficulty. The most natural definition of density seems to be the expected size of the set returned by the mechanism. However, this notion does not yield the desired boost. (This is related to the fact that we cannot get any contradiction for coverage functions.) The notion of density that turns out to be useful is more complicated; it is derived from functions that exhibit non-concave behavior of the extension F exp . This strategy will be made more explicit in the following.
The symmetry gap: At level j+1, we consider valuation functions of the form
where φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a suitable non-decreasing concave function. Note that under this valuation function, the value of a (random) set R depends only on how many elements it takes from A (j) and B (j) . In particular, if we denote X j =
Since this expected value depends only on X j , Y j , we say that X j , Y j represent the distribution of R.
By the symmetry gap argument [15] , [26] (if the valuation function is suitably perturbed and the partition (A (j) , B (j) ) is random), the mechanism with high probability returns a solution R (j+1) independent of the partition and hence symmetric with respect to it. Denoting X j+1 = |R (j+1) ∩A (j+1) | |A (j+1) | , we obtain that the mechanism returns expected value
which is typically less than
(There are certain error terms arising from the symmetry gap argument but let us ignore them here.) The main point here is that if the mechanism is MIDR, then the expected value of the returned random set E[f A (j) ,B (j) (R (j+1) )] must be at least that of any other random set whose distribution is in the rangein particular, the random set R (j) whose presence in the range we prove at the previous level. If this random set R (j) is represented by the random variables X j , Y j , then the mechanism must return a distribution represented by X j+1 such that
In fact we ignore the contribution of Y j and use the weaker inequality
Hence, the existence of certain distributions in the range forces the existence of other distributions, satisfying the bound (4).
Gap amplification: Now we would like to say that if two distributions represented by X j and X j+1 satisfy (4), then the distribution at level j + 1 is "more dense" than the one at level j. Considering the scaling at different levels, we want to prove that X j+1 is "significantly larger" than 1 2 X j . This is intuitive, since X j+1 = 1 2 X j is not enough to satisfy (4), for example when φ is linear. Unfortunately, (4) does not imply any useful relationship between the expectations
For example, we could have X j = 1 with probability ξ − ξ 2 and 0 otherwise. Then X j+1 = 1 2 ξ satisfies (4) for any concave function φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. This does not provide a constantfactor improvement over 1 2 E[X j ]. We still want to prove that X j+1 is in some sense "significantly larger" than 1 2 X j . Our main technical inequality formalizing this intuition is the following: Define φ α (t) = min t α , 1 . Then for any distribution in the range represented by X j at level j and any α j ∈ [0, 1], there is a distribution in the range represented by X j+1 at level j + 1, and α j+1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
where δ > 0 is some (small) absolute constant. The use of 1 + δ in the exponent is crucial here. The proof of (5) is quite technical; a rough sketch goes as follows. By (4), there is a distribution at level j + 1 such that
We split into 2 cases:
1) If Pr[X j+1 > α j √ δ] is at least some small constant, then we set α j+1 = 1+δ 2 α j . We use the fact that if X j+1 > α j √ δ, then 2X j+1 /α j is a constant-factor larger than 1 − (1 − X j+1 /α j ) 2 , and therefore E[φ αj+1 (X j+1 )] is a constant-factor larger than 1 1+δ E[φ αj (X j )]. From here, we prove
2) If X j+1 is mostly in the interval [0, α j √ δ], then we set α j+1 = α j √ δ, i.e. much smaller than α j . We gain in this case, because E[φ αj+1 (X j+1 )] is much larger than E[φ αj (X j )], by a factor of 1−O(δ) 2 √ δ , and this factor is amplified by the power of 1 + δ. From this, we deduce
The contradiction: Using (5), we arrive at a contradiction as follows. As we already mentioned, assuming that an MIDR mechanism provides a c-approximation for the CPP problem, then for any feasible set A (0) there must be a distribution D 0 in its range such that
Now we apply the symmetry gap argument and the gap amplification technique to random pairs of sets (A (j) , B (j) ) at each level j. Starting from E[X 0 ] ≥ c and α 0 = 1, by repeated use of (5) we obtain that there is α ∈ [0, 1] and a distribution at level represented by X such that
The meaning of X is simply the fraction of the ground set that the mechanism returns at level . Since m = 2 O( ) , we have 2 δ 2 ≥ m (1+δ)γ for some constant γ > 0. If the approximation factor is c ≥ m −γ , then we get E[X ] > 2 − , which would violate the cardinality constraint of the CPP problem.
HARDNESS FOR COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
The following is our main result for combinatorial auctions.
Theorem 5.1. There are absolute constants , γ > 0 such that there is no (1− )-approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with monotone submodular valuation functions in the value oracle model, achieving a better than 1/n γ -approximation in expectation in terms of social welfare, where the number of players is n and the number of items is m = poly(n).
Discussion: This theorem extends previous negative results for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuation functions, which were known only in the cases of deterministic truthful and randomized universally truthful mechanisms [9] . Also, it appears that as stated these results do not rule out approximately truthful mechanisms.
We remark that there is still the possibility of a truthfulin-expectation (TIE) mechanism in the "lottery-value" oracle model which was introduced in [11] . Here, a player is able to provide the exact expectation E[v i ( x)] for a product distribution given by x. Since the exact expectations E[v i ( x)] are hard to compute even in very special cases like the budget-additive case, this is a severe limitation. Our hardness result does not apply directly to this stronger oracle model. However, what our result implies is that if a truthful-in-expectation mechanism exists in the lottery-value model, then it must be very sensitive to the accuracy of the oracle's answers, and does not remain even approximately truthful-in-expectation if the oracle's answers involve some small noise. This is because if we had a mechanism in the lottery-value oracle model, which remains approximately TIE under small noise in the oracle and provides a good approximation, then we could simulate this mechanism in the value oracle model (by sample-average approximation). Thus we would obtain an approximately TIE mechanism contradicting Theorem 5.1.
Proof strategy: Our hardness result for combinatorial public projects (Section 4) can be adapted to show that there is no (approximately) MIDR mechanism for submodular combinatorial auctions that guarantees a good approximation ratio. However, unlike in CPP, we are unable to prove that truthful-in-expectation mechanisms and MIDR algorithms are equivalent in power (even in the approximate sense). This is not surprising, since randomized truthful mechanisms that are not maximal-in-distributional-range have been designed for combinatorial auctions (see for example [5] ). Therefore, additional ideas are needed to rule out all truthfulin-expectation mechanisms. Such ideas have been recently put forth in a paper by Dobzinski [9] . The direct hardness approach of [9] provides a way to avoid the characterization step and instead attack the truthful mechanism directly. This idea applies to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms as well.
The main idea of the direct hardness approach can be stated as follows. If we identify a special player whose range of possible allocations is sufficiently "rich" when the valuations of other players are fixed to particular functions, then we can work with the special player directly using the taxation principle: There is a fixed price for each distribution over allocations in the "range" of the mechanism as the special player varies his valuation, and the mechanism outputs the distribution in this range that maximizes the player's utility (his expected value for the distribution on allocations less the price of that distribution). Thus, our symmetry gap techniques from Section 4 apply here quite naturally, though the presence of payments poses an additional technical challenge that was not present for CPP. In the following, we present a sketch of our proof.
The basic instance: We start from the following "basic instance". For an integer , we construct instances with |N | = n = 2 players and |M | = m = poly(n) items. Each player has a "polar valuation" v * i (as in [9] ), where items in a certain set A i | = m/n. A counting argument shows that if a mechanism provides a c-approximation in social welfare, then there must be a player whose allocated set R 
By an averaging argument, this is also true for a certain fixed choice of the other players' valuations. In the following, we fix that choice and consider varying valuations for player i only, who we refer to as the "special player". We also drop the index i, since we do not consider the other players anymore.
In the following, we set ω = c/8,
Hence we can estimate the expected value received by the special player as follows:
. So the special player's utility in the basic instance (in expectation over the random instances) is m n E[X 0 ], up to a factor of 2.
Symmetry gap again: We consider valuations for the special player at levels, in the same form that we considered in the case of combinatorial public projects. The difference now is that the mechanism is not necessarily maximal-in-distributional-range. Instead, we use the definition of truthfulness in expectation directly. The same symmetry gap argument as in Section 4 gives the following: If there is a random set R (j) possibly allocated at level j at a price P j , and X j = |R (j) ∩A (j) | |A (j) | , then there is a random set R (j+1) possibly allocated at level j + 1 at a price P j+1 , and X j+1 = |R (j+1) ∩A (j+1) | |A (j+1) | , so that
Again, we are ignoring certain error terms and we are also ignoring the issue of approximate truthfulness. Using the fact that the valuation functions can be scaled arbitrarily and the mechanism must still be truthful in expectation, we obtain that for any λ , λ ≥ 0, there is distribution possibly allocated at level j + 1 such that
(6) Convex hulls and the separation argument: Our goal is to eliminate the prices from the picture, so that we can use arguments similar to Section 4. For that purpose, it is convenient to pass to convex hulls as follows. We define the distribution menu M j at level j to consist of all distributions of pairs of random variables (X j , P j ), such that X j = |R (j) ∩A (j) | |A (j) | for some random set R (j) allocated for a level-j valuation at a price P j . Then we define the closure of a distribution menu, M j , to be the topological closure of the convex hull of M j (in the sense of taking convex combinations of distributions). By convexity, (6) still holds in the sense that for any (X j , P j ) with a distribution in M j and any λ , λ ≥ 0, there is (X j+1 , P j+1 ) with a distribution in M j+1 such that (6) holds.
A convex separation argument, essentially Farkas' lemma in 2 dimensions, actually implies the following. For any (X j , P j ) with a distribution in M j , there is (X j+1 , P j+1 ) with a distribution in M j+1 such that E[P j+1 ] ≤ E[P j ] and
In other words, there is a distribution in the closure of the menu at level j + 1 at a price no higher than the price we had at level j, and the respective random variables X j , X j+1 satisfy the same relationship (4) that we had in Section 4. The rest of the proof goes exactly as in Section 4, using (5) and eventually producing a distribution represented by (X , P ) in M such that E[P ] ≤ E[P 0 ] and
Here, (X 0 , P 0 ) represents the distribution and price allocated in the basic instance. Now we consider the utility that the distribution represented by (X , P ) would provide in the basic instance: since every element has value at least ω there, the utility would be
Recall that the distribution of (X , P ) is not on the menu M but rather in its convex hull. However, by using the properties of the convex hull, there must be a distribution on the actual menu M that satisfies the same linear inequality. So we can assume without loss of generality that the distribution of (X , P ) is on the actual menu at level , and R ( ) is the respective random set that would be allocated to the special player if he declared a level-valuation.
Recall that in the basic instance, the value received by the special player is at most 2m n E[X 0 ], and the respective utility is at most 2m n E[X 0 ] − E[P 0 ]. We also have n = 2 and E[X 0 ] ≥ c/4 − ω = c/8. If c = 8ω ≥ n −γ for a suitable constant γ > 0, we would obtain from (7) that the special player could substantially improve his utility in the basic instance by declaring a level-valuation instead. We conclude that this would contradict the property of truthfulness in expectation.
